
HISTORY

9389/11

Paper 1 Document Question

October/November 2016

MARK SCHEME

Maximum Mark: 40

Published

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Generic Levels of Response

Part (a)

Level 4: Makes a developed comparison [12–15]

Makes a developed comparison between the two sources, recognising points of similarity and difference. Uses knowledge to evaluate the sources and shows good contextual awareness.

Level 3: Compares views and identifies similarities *and* differences [8–11]

Compares the views expressed in the sources, identifying differences and similarities. Begins to explain and evaluate the views using the sources and knowledge.

Level 2: Compares views and identifies similarities *and/or* differences [4–7]

Identifies relevant similarities or differences between views/sources and the response may be one-sided with only one aspect explained. Alternatively, both similarities and differences may be mentioned but both aspects lack development.

Level 1: Describes content of each source [1–3]

Describes or paraphrases the content of the two sources. Very simple comparisons may be made (e.g. one is from a letter and the other is from a speech) but these are not developed.

Level 0: No relevant comment on the sources or the issue [0]

Part (b)

Level 5: Evaluates the sources to reach a sustained judgement [21–25]

Answers are well focused, demonstrating a clear understanding of the sources and the question. Reaches a sustained judgement about the extent to which the sources support the statement and weighs the evidence in order to do this.

Level 4: Evaluates the sources [16–20]

Demonstrates a clear understanding of the sources and the question. Begins to evaluate the material in context, considering the nature, origin and purpose of the sources in relation to the statement. At the top of this level candidates may begin to reach a judgement but this is not sustained.

Level 3: Uses the sources to support *and* challenge the statement [11–15]

Makes valid points from the sources to both challenge and support the statement in the question. These comments may be derived from source content or may be about the provenance/nature of the sources.

Level 2: Uses the sources to support *or* challenge the statement [6–10]

Makes valid points from the sources to either support the statement in the question or to challenge it. These comments may be derived from source content or may be about the provenance/nature of the sources.

Level 1: Does not make valid use of the sources [1–5]

Describes the content of the sources with little attempt to link the material to the question. Alternatively, candidates may write an essay about the question without reference to the sources.

Level 0: No relevant comment on the sources or the issue [0]

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Section A: European Option

Liberalism and Nationalism in Italy and Germany, 1815–1871

Bismarck and France

Indicative content

- 1 (a) To what extent do Sources B and D agree on Bismarck's views on a war with France? [15]

Source B shows awareness that there may well be conflict; the key word is 'probable', and there is the suggestion that it may well be with France. However, B also suggests there is a possibility of agreement, although unlikely, with the French over German unification aspirations. Bismarck also indicates the importance of not acquiring responsibility for any future conflict and of waiting on events. The letter is written to a key Prussian ambassador. It is therefore likely to be a good indicator of Bismarck's own views and was not intended for publication. D is very different in that it is a personal recollection written some years after the event, but of course there would be no need to be 'diplomatic'. The reference to the 'conspirators' is quite suggestive, but there is also the reference to the 'favourable opportunity' which suggests a degree of pragmatism and a willingness to concede quite a lot to the French to avoid conflict. However, the final point about preparations is very revealing. There is a basic agreement between the two sources, but more evidence of pragmatism in the first.

- (b) To what extent do Sources A to D show that Prussia was responsible for the war against France? [25]

While Source A comments on the 'uneasiness' in Germany, it makes it clear that the French are making military preparations and are looking for a war with Germany. While the author is British and detached from the two 'sides', his position may not give him access to the real decision makers. It places responsibility firmly on France, but then it was written four years before the actual war. B shows that Bismarck is certainly thinking of conflict – and conflict with the French – but is waiting for events to enable him to attain his objectives. C makes it very clear that it was the French who were to blame, but given the speech maker and the circumstances he could not be expected to say anything else. D gives a slightly different picture and while it mentions the degree of opportunism, it also makes it clear that ample planning for a French invasion had taken place and that war had been deliberately provoked.

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Section B: American Option

The Origins of the Civil War, 1846–1861

Zachary Taylor and the Wilmot Proviso, 1848

Indicative content

- 2 (a) To what extent do Sources A and B agree about General Taylor's commitment to Whig principles? [15]

Zachary Taylor belongs to that group of US presidents who were elected after careers in the US army, which eventually resulted in their leading the army into conflicts in which they became national war heroes. Taylor is probably the least well known of this group. The war itself was little known outside the Americas. He was President for just sixteen months in 1849–50 before dying of a stomach ailment. Standing as the Whig candidate, Taylor himself took no active part in the 1848 election campaign. He intended to remain above party politics as far as he could. This was next to impossible given the arguments about how to absorb the new lands gained from Mexico. The great issue was whether slavery should be established in these new western territories. Taylor was himself a Southern slave owner, as mentioned by Source A. He grew up in Kentucky, from where his father bought slave plantations in Tennessee. Source A is critical of Taylor, arguing that he has no commitment to Whig principles. This differentiates A from B, which defends Taylor, arguing that he occupied a 'high and unexceptional Whig ground'. The two sources are similar in that they both agree that having a single set of principles which can be applied to all parts of the USA is impossible. Source A sees this as a weakness, Source B as a strength. Source A is a partisan, anti-Whig pamphlet published in election year and thus of dubious reliability. Source B is a public speech by Abraham Lincoln, again in election year, and thus as partisan as Source A, if using more temperate language.

- (b) How far do Sources A to D support the assertion that the Whig party was deeply divided over the extension of slavery? [25]

The political parties of the time, Whig and Democrat, were national parties. Both had some support in all parts of the USA. The Democrats were the stronger. Built around the ideas and leadership of Andrew Jackson in the 1830s, the Democrats were the populist party, suspicious of federal government, keen to develop an America of small towns and agriculture and thus was popular both North and South. The Whigs were more middle class and keener on both federal government support in developing national infrastructure projects and on national tariffs to pay for them. The combination of Northern and Southern Whigs was a fragile one as the party contained both urban abolitionists and rural slave owners. The expanse of lands gained from Mexico in 1848 put the Whig party under much more pressure. The Wilmot Proviso, which tried to limit the expansion of slavery into the new lands, became the focus of these strains and started the process which led in the mid-1850s to the realignment of the political parties and the establishment of the Republican party.

Source A argues that Taylor's lack of policy commitments fitted perfectly the Whigs' deep divisions over slavery. In the North he could be portrayed as in favour of the Wilmot Proviso, in the South as being opposed to the Proviso, thereby glossing over the cracks within the Whig party. Source A is supported by Source C, which focuses on the attitude of Northern Whigs towards the expansion of slavery. It points out the contradiction between the Northern Whigs' view that Taylor supports the Wilmot Proviso with the fact that he is a slave owner. On the other hand, Source B does not see the Whigs as being deeply divided. Lincoln argues that a national party in a country as diverse as the USA cannot have a single platform

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which will be acceptable to all parts of the country. There are bound to be differences of emphasis according to section and region. Source D also challenges the hypothesis, arguing that Taylor will not block the Wilmot Proviso, if approved by Congress. In arguing thus, Source D contradicts Source C.

Sources C and D contradict each other's argument. Each comes from a sectional and presumably partisan newspaper. Both are written in the autumn of 1848, when the presidential election campaign was becoming more intense. Both were aimed to appeal to their readers. Both are indeed partisan. Source C argues that Taylor's self-interest means that he cannot work with the abolitionists of the North. Source D asserts that Taylor dislikes the institution of slavery, a contradiction with Source C which cannot easily be resolved. However, Source D goes on to say that Taylor does not want to see slavery extend beyond its present limits – which is exactly what the Wilmot Proviso intends to achieve. It is possible to be a [Southern] slave owner, opposed to the abolition of slavery, and yet not want slavery extended to the West. Source D is the more reliable of the two.

Source A is even more partisan than either Source C or Source D. It comes from the party whose candidate is competing with Taylor for the presidency. Its content needs to be viewed very sceptically. Source C does support some of the assertions of Source A but that is to be expected of a Southern source and thus does little to improve the reliability of Source A.

Finally, Source B is a Northern newspaper report of a speech by Abraham Lincoln at the start of his political career. There is a danger in assuming that because Lincoln is speaking, therefore the source will be reliable. Lincoln, however, is a Whig politician making a speech in election year in favour of the Whig presidential candidate, which brings the source's reliability into doubt. Source D gives some support to Source B but then Source D is another partisan source. Source B states that Lincoln did consider the arguments of those who oppose Taylor, which means that his speech was more balanced, less one-sided than the others. Also, contextual knowledge of the era suggests that Whig divisions in 1848 were not as deep as they became in the 1850s, when the party split in two.

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Section C: International Option

The Search for International Peace and Security, 1919–1945

The League of Nations and Disarmament, 1919–1921

Indicative content

- 3 (a) **Compare and contrast the views of Lloyd George (Source A) and the French delegate (Source D) regarding the League of Nations' ability to maintain peace and security. [15]**

Lloyd George (Source A) argues that the League of Nations could provide international peace and security, but only if the victorious Allied powers were prepared to work together in mutual trust and understanding. He suggests that a key element of this involves disarmament. He feels that it would be wrong and counterproductive to impose arms reduction on Germany unless the leading Allied nations were prepared to reduce their own armaments. By working together through the League, countries would be able to ensure their national security without needing their own large-scale armaments. The implication is that Britain is prepared to commit itself to disarmament, provided its main allies (the USA, France and Italy) do likewise. Without such mutual trust and understanding, he believes that the League would fail.

The French delegate (Source D) is not convinced that the League and its Covenant provide France with effective security. Although Germany has complied with the disarmament requirements imposed by the Treaty of Versailles, France is concerned about the possibility of future German rearmament. As a result, France believes that it must retain its armaments in order to protect its own national security, a clear indication that France does not believe the League is capable of preserving international peace and security. France, therefore, seems to lack the trust which Lloyd George believed was vital for the League's success.

Lloyd George was writing in March 1919, during the negotiations at the Paris peace conference. At that stage, the League of Nations' Covenant had not been finalised or agreed, and the USA's subsequent refusal to either ratify the peace settlement or join the League of Nations was not known. While Lloyd George clearly shared US President Wilson's idealistic belief in the importance of establishing a League of Nations, he is realistic enough to identify issues which might lead to the League's failure. He believes that collective security, a fundamental element of the League, could only work if countries worked together in mutual trust and understanding; he displays some scepticism regarding the prospect of this actually happening.

The French delegate was speaking in 1921. By this time, it was clear that Lloyd George's pre-conditions for the League's success in maintaining peace and security had not been met. The USA had failed to ratify the peace settlement and refused to join the League. This seriously undermined French confidence since it meant that France was no longer guaranteed the support of both Britain and the USA in the event of any future German attack. Italy, disenchanted with the terms of the peace settlement, was lukewarm in its support of the League. France and Britain had disagreed about how severely to treat Germany in the Treaty of Versailles. Britain, with a vested interest in Germany's economic recovery, argued for less severe terms than those desired by Clemenceau. France was also concerned by the fact that the League of Nations did not have its own army or police force; in effect, France would be relying on the armed forces of other countries, whose support could not be guaranteed. France therefore felt vulnerable and did not believe that the League would be able to guarantee its national security. Moreover, by 1921, Britain had itself set increased armaments budgets.

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- (b) How far do Sources A to D support the view that there was strong support for disarmament in the period from 1919 to 1921? [25]**

One of Wilson's main aims at the Paris peace conference was to create a situation in which future war was impossible. Key elements in this were the establishment of a League of Nations, based on mutual trust and understanding, and a reduction in armaments to prevent the kind of arms race which led to WWI. Weary of war and afraid of another, the people of Europe shared Wilson's dream. At Paris, therefore, there was a general feeling that global disarmament was a vital prerequisite of lasting peace and security. This was enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations, signed by 44 nations in 1919 and operative from January 1920. The concept was that each nation's territorial integrity would be guaranteed by the League's members working together in collective security, thereby rendering unwarranted aggression bound to fail; nations would, therefore, not need to maintain their own large-scale armaments as a means of security.

A combination of idealism and political expediency had encouraged politicians to commit their countries to disarmament, but this commitment was never honoured. While Germany disarmed in line with the terms of the Treaty of Versailles, other countries did not. The USA did not ratify the peace settlement or join the League of Nations; it increased the size of its navy in order to protect its Pacific interests. France, fearing a revival of German power, insisted on maintaining a high level of armaments, arguing that the League offered no guarantee of protection because it lacked its own army or police force. Italy, disenchanted with the peace settlement, made its expansionist intentions clear. Britain increased the size of the armaments budget. Before the Covenant was finalised and agreed, Lloyd George had argued that the League could only be successful if member states trusted each other; it quickly became apparent that this prerequisite of success was missing. As late as 1932, when the World Disarmament Conference opened, no progress had been made on the key issue of disarmament, much to the resentment of Germany.

In support of the hypothesis – The British Prime Minister (Source A) is clearly committed to disarmament. He argues that disarmament is vital if the League of Nations is to be successful, since it would help to reduce suspicion between countries and increase mutual trust and cooperation. He also argues that it would be wrong and counter-productive to impose disarmament on Germany and the defeated nations if the major Allied nations were not prepared to make a similar commitment. Implicit in this is the view that the whole peace settlement would fail unless all countries embraced disarmament. The Covenant of the League of Nations included Article VIII (Source B), and was signed by 44 nations on 28 June 1919. These nations included Britain, the USA, France and Italy, the four nations whose commitment to disarmament Lloyd George (Source A) had identified as vital for the League's success. In signing the Covenant, countries were committing themselves to disarmament, entrusting the League of Nations to provide them with territorial security. Countries would not be allowed to exceed armaments limits established by the League of Nations, and would be expected to provide the League with full details of their military capabilities. The American writer of Source C clearly supports the League of Nations and argues that disarmament is vital in the interests of future peace. He suggests that popular opinion in Europe is heavily in favour of disarmament and shows that even some leading politicians support it (e.g. Denmark's Minister of Defence).

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In challenging the hypothesis – The American writer of Source C argues that, while disarmament is a good idea in theory, in reality there is little possibility of it happening. The USA, not bound by any commitment to the League of Nations, has already announced its intention to increase the size of its navy. The source makes it clear that Britain and France, *'under their present governments'*, have no intention of honouring their commitment to disarmament. The writer suggests that countries are putting their own national interests above their commitment to the League of Nations – interests such as protecting their empires (e.g. Britain) or satisfying their territorial ambitions (e.g. Italy). While the *'common people'* of Europe want their countries to disarm, politicians are reluctant to do so (except those representing small, unwarlike countries such as Denmark). As reflected in Source D, the French government lacked trust in the League's ability to guarantee peace and security. Fearful of a resurgence of German power, which would pose a threat to France, the French government felt it necessary to maintain its own large-scale armaments. In Source A, the British Prime Minister argues in favour of disarmament, but seems a little sceptical about whether countries will have sufficient mutual trust to make it a reality.

Source A – Written at a fairly early stage of the Paris peace talks and before the Covenant was either finalised or signed. It reflects Britain's support for President Wilson's aim to create a fair and lasting peace, one which was not too harsh on the defeated Germany, in whose economic resurgence Britain had a vested interest. Lloyd George clearly supports the proposed League of Nations, but is fully aware of potential issues which could cause it to fail. He supports disarmament because he believes it is the only way to develop the trust and mutual understanding between nations which will be vital for the League's success.

Source B – After a lengthy process of drafting and debate, the Covenant was signed by the representatives of 44 nations on 28 June 1919, becoming effective from January 1920. Taken literally (as the US Senate did), it suggests that the League of Nations would decide the level of armaments which each member state would be allowed. Most signatories clearly did not take the wording literally; they believed that national security (including armaments) remained an internal issue, to be determined by their own governments. The Article contains the phrase *'the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety'*; this is open to various interpretations – for example, France would argue that its views as expressed in Source D are not inconsistent with its commitment to the Covenant.

Source C – Written in June 1920, by which time the USA had rejected both the Paris peace settlement and the League of Nations. It was, therefore, no longer committed to the Covenant and had announced its plans to increase the size of its navy. Lloyd George's pre-conditions for the League's success were, therefore, already broken. France, no longer guaranteed American support in the event of German hostility, felt the need to maintain its own military capabilities (as in Source D). Despite his country's attitude, the writer clearly supports the concept of a League of Nations – he is critical both of the USA's rejection of the League and of leading European politicians' refusal to embrace disarmament. He argues that European public opinion is in favour of disarmament, but provides no substantial evidence to support this. Denmark is a relatively small, militarily weak and potentially vulnerable nation; it is not surprising, therefore, that its politicians would favour international disarmament – collective security provided by the League of Nations would have appeared to offer better protection than Denmark could provide for itself. Published in an American magazine, the article is critical of US government policy; it is possible, therefore, that it may have been politically motivated.

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Source D – In Source A, Lloyd George argues that the League would only be successful if the members '*trust it themselves*'. Clearly, the French government did not trust it, doubting its ability to provide peace and security. The speech was made in 1921, by which time the USA had already rejected the League and embarked on its own programme of enhanced armaments. French concerns of a resurgent Germany remained strong, and France felt the need to protect itself against possible future German aggression. It is evident that France did not believe collective security could protect it. Although the speech reiterates France's commitment to the League of Nations, it reflects the determination of the French to protect themselves.